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The
parallels between the emergency rescue operations for the Euro and the
fundamental rights intervention of the ECJ in Hungary are evident: both cases reveal
structural shortcomings of the EU Treaties and the advocates of "more Europe"
support enhanced supranational supervision and control. This return to the method
of integration of the 1970s is risky.
The shortcomings of the EU Treaties are obvious. The creation of the Euro has
not been accompanied by a common EU economic policy and EU fundamental
rights are characterized by  asymmetry. It is unconvincing that the EU scrutinises
the human rights compliance of accession candidates (such as Serbia) and third
countries (such as Syria), but may criticise Hungary only indirectly with regard to the
independence of the data protection commissioner.
Given these structural shortcomings, it is natural to look to  the ECJ for a solution.
After all, it is up to the courts to develop  a coherent legal order from current
inconsistencies.  Why should the ECJ not become active and enforce the European
values? There are three considerations against this: practicability; preoccupation for
legal integration; and the hope for political solutions.
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No Practical Solutions for Hungary
As a starting point, the proposal of Armin von Bogdandy and his team (at least in the
long version) deals with a concrete problem: the Courts should cope with Hungary’s
constitutional changes by linking  Union citizenship with fundamental rights. This
creates the impression that the proposal would be of practical help for Hungary –
which is not the case. In particular the application of the reversed ‘Solange’-formula
is not feasible. Why? The legal standards for assessing the ‘substance of rights’
benchmark remain vague.
The only thing that is certain is that the ‘substance of rights’ relates to a minimum
level of protection. By way of example the proposal mentions ‘refusal to abide
by a final judgment of the ECtHR in a domain that touches upon the essence of
fundamental rights’ or ‘intentional, reckless or evidently illicit conduct of highest state
authorities.’ What this means in concrete terms is not stated, for  good reason. Legal
certainty could only be achieved if ‘regular’ fundamental rights applied instead of
a reference to a vague minimum level of protection. But this recourse is prevented
by the proviso that Article 51 Charter of Fundamental Rights should be expressly
preserved.
The Ruiz Zambrano judgment of the ECJ shows the difficulties of applying such
abstract standards. It states in vague terms that the ‘genuine enjoyment of the
substance of the rights’ (Kernbestand der Rechte / l’essentiel des droits) conferred
by EU citizenship may not be touched (that von Bogdandy and his team speak of
‘essence / Wesensgehalt’ instead underlines the lack of clarity on the applicable
legal standard). Moreover, the ECJ’s Grand Chamber does  not itself know  what
is covered in concrete terms. In its Dereci judgment of 15 November 2011 on five
different cases in a  preliminary reference form Austria, the ECJ remains deliberately
vague: presumably the substance of rights was not denied, although a different
conclusion was also conceivable; the national court should therefor re-consider the
cases and decide by itself.
A quick remedy can thus not be expected by the ECJ. In any case, the ‘substance
of rights doctrine’ can only be a subsidiary safety net. This is required not least
because of the procedural respect for the self-correction mechanisms, which the
Federal Constitutional Court rightly demands from the ECJ in its ‘Solange’ cases.
Before engaging Luxembourg, national courts and the ECtHR must be called upon.
This is what we should focus on: strengthening Strasbourg in order to avoid  the
possibility that ECtHR judgments are permanently ignored.
Limits of Integration through Law
Most of the innovations of the ECJ can be explained by concern for the
supranational legal community. This applies to the doctrines of direct effect and
state liability as well as unwritten human rights which secured the supremacy of EU
law. Even at present, legal integration remains at risk. Public opinion is (wrongly)
convinced that EU law is systematically broken, in order to rescue the Euro and only
recently, on 15 February 2012, a national constitutional court denounced for the first
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time an ECJ ruling as an ultra vires act, to which allegiance at national level was to
be refused.
Note that I do not claim that the proposal of Armin von Bogdandy and his team is
an ultra vires act. It is far too intelligently reasoned out. In a clever and dogmatically
convincing way, all key counter-arguments are considered (albeit at the price that
the legal standard remains vague). One can without doubt defend the proposal.
It is another question, however, as to whether another innovative judgment from
Strasbourg would ‘ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the
law is observed’ (Art. 19 TEU) at this moment in time.
In my opinion, the risks outweigh the benefits. The supranational legal community
relies on the national courts’ compliance. But compliance must be reaffirmed
regularly. If the ECJ seeks to foster compliance, its rulings must be perceived as
legitimate. This includes sound reasoning and predictable outcomes. The ECJ
neglected both in  Ruiz Zambrano  and doctrinal tricks with the scope of fundamental
rights would meet similar criticism. It would endanger the credibility of the ECJ  and
the supranational legal community at large. This is a high price, especially as the
ECJ  could very well entrust the ECtHR with the supervision of Hungary.
Towards Political Solutions
There is an important difference between the Euro crisis  and the Hungary debate:
the latter can be solved by politics alone. If the Hungarian government relents, the
problem ceases to exist. You do not need private investors which satisfy national
governments’ credit needs. The solution should take this political character of
Hungary debate seriously – in the long-term self-interest of the European Union. A
sustainable strategy for ‘more Europe’ cannot  be achieved only by strengthening
supranational supervision, but instead requires the construction of the European
Union from below by EU citizens, national courts and political parties.
In the Europe of the future, the end does not justify all means anymore. Maybe the
reduction of the Greek minimum wages and pensions is in the best interest of the
Greek people, because the alternative, state bankruptcy, would bring much higher
real wage losses. Similarly, Hungary has to respect the fundamental right to freedom
of the media uncompromisingly (and not only the essence!). But rescue packages
for the Euro and for  fundamental rights shouldn’t only consider the result. If we want
to build a democratic Europe, the path taken as well as the process are of intrinsic
value.
For this reason I am not persuaded by the return to the method of integration of
the 1970s. It has been rightly pointed out that the proposal relies on an integration
through law and courts (similar  to the Euro Fiscal Pact enforcement by the
Commission). This is not enough. There is more at stake than the ECJ’s order
to the Netherlands to reduce the tariff rate on formaldehyde (as per the facts
in Van Gend en Loos). Those who cut pensions and prohibit a democratically
elected government ,to implement its election programme, should not solely rely on
supranational supervision. The European Republic cannot be prescribed by the ECJ.
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